Abstract. Coin flipping and bit commitment are two fundamental cryptographic primitives with numerous applications. Quantum information allows for such protocols in the information theoretic setting where no dishonest party can perfectly cheat. The previously best-known quantum coin flipping and bit commitment protocol by Ambainis achieved a cheating probability of at most 3/4 [3] . On the other hand, Kitaev showed that no quantum coin flipping or bit commitment protocol can have cheating probability less than 1/ √ 2 [15]. Closing these gaps has been one of the important open questions in quantum cryptography.
1. Introduction.
Cryptographic primitives.
Cryptography is the practice and study of hiding information. Applications of cryptography include ATM cards, electronic commerce or more simply the possibility of sending an email without being spied on. Cryptography is widely used in everyday life. If we had to analyze and prove security for each cryptosystem separately, the probability of making errors would be huge so we use some basic building blocks and assemble them to build more complex cryptosystems. It is these building blocks, that we call cryptographic primitives, that will be studied in this article. We study here some fundamental cryptographic primitives: coin flipping and bit commitment.
Coin flipping is a cryptographic primitive that enables two distrustful and far apart parties, Alice and Bob, to create a random bit that remains unbiased even if one of the players tries to force a specific outcome. It was first proposed by Blum [5] and has since found many applications in two-party secure computation.
A bit commitment protocol consists of two phases: in the commit phase, Alice commits to a bit b; in the reveal phase, Alice reveals the bit to Bob. We want to ensure two things: that Bob has no information about b after the commit phase and that Alice cannot change her mind when revealing b.
In the classical setting, these primitives are widely used to construct cryptosystems, so quantum computing does not seem to be necessary. However, all these classical protocols rely on some computational assumption. For example, it is possible to perform (almost) perfect coin flipping under the assumption that factoring integers is hard. All current classical cryptographic primitives rely on such hardness assumptions. We say that such primitives are computationally secure.
A stronger notion of security is information theoretic security. In this setting, the primitives must be secure even against an all powerful cheating player, typically a player who can easily factor and easily perform any kind of operation. In the classical setting, we know that it is impossible to achieve information theoretic security for most of these cryptographic primitives. Even worse, when considering all powerful cheating players, we have the following statement.
In any classical coin flipping or bit commitment protocol, there is a party which can cheat with probability 1 in the information theoretic setting (i.e. when the cheating player is computationally unbounded).
This means that such primitives are impossible to perform in the classical model of computation.
Physical limitations of quantum cryptographic primitives.
Quantum information has given us the opportunity to revisit information theoretic security in cryptography. One of the first breakthrough result was the quantum key distribution protocol of Bennett and Brassard [4] , following early results of Wiesner [24] . Thenceforth, many studies focused on which other cryptographic primitives are possible with the help of quantum information. Several subsequent results were not positive. For example, Mayers and independently Lo and Chau proved the impossibility of secure quantum bit commitment and oblivious transfer and consequently of any type of two-party secure computation [17, 16, 10] .
These impossibility results rule out the ability to build perfect cryptographic primitives. However, it could be possible to build some quantum cryptographic primitives which are almost perfect. Aharanov et al. [2] first showed how to construct imperfect quantum bit commitment with cheating probabilities smaller than 0.9143. The best known protocol was due to Ambainis who constructed a quantum bit commitment scheme (and a quantum coin flipping protocol) where no player can cheat with probability greater than 3/4 [3] , when the other player is honest, which gives the following statement:
There is a quantum coin flipping protocol and a quantum bit commitment scheme, where each player can cheat with probability at most 3/4.
On the other hand, Kitaev showed that it is not possible to build quantum coin flipping protocols which have low cheating probability in the information theoretic setting [15] :
In any quantum coin flipping or quantum bit commitment scheme, there is a player who can cheat with probability at least
The way to interpret this is that the laws of quantum physics allow us theoretically to construct coin flipping protocols with cheating probability 3/4; but no physically realizable coin flipping protocol with cheating probability less than
exists. There is also another notion of coin flipping which has been studied: quantum weak coin flipping. In this case, we want to make sure that Alice cannot force the "heads" outcome and that Bob cannot force the "tails" outcome. However, unlike regular coin flipping, it is not excluded that Alice can force the "tails" outcome with probability 1 and that Bob can force the "heads" outcome with probability 1. After several articles [18, 19, 20] , Mochon showed how to build a quantum weak coin flipping protocol with a bias arbitrarily close to 0. As opposed to this weak notion of coin flipping, we will refer to the coin flipping when no outcome should be biased as strong coin flipping. Notice that even for this weaker definition, it is impossible to exhibit a classical protocol.
Contribution.
We provide the optimal physical bounds for these quantum cryptographic primitives. In Section 4, we study quantum coin flipping. We show here how to construct a quantum coin flipping protocol with cheating probability arbitrarily close to 1 √ 2 . From Kitaev's lower bound, we know that our protocols are arbitrarily close to optimal. More precisely, we show the following Theorem 1. For any ε > 0, there exists a quantum strong coin flipping protocol with cheating probability
To show this, we actually use Mochon's construction of optimal quantum weak coin flipping. We build a classical protocol where we use weak coin flipping as a subroutine. This means that the ability to perform strong coin flipping with cheating probability arbitrarily close to
comes from the ability to perform weak coin flipping with arbitrarily small bias. If we could build a perfect classical weak coin flipping protocol then our construction would give a classical strong coin flipping protocol with cheating probability 1 √ 2 . We then investigate the physical bounds for quantum bit commitment. Before our work, the best known bounds for quantum coin flipping and quantum bit commitment were the same. It was not clear whether these two primitives had the same optimal bound or not. In Section 5, we show that this is not the case. We first show an improved lower bound for quantum bit commitment.
Theorem 2. In any quantum bit commitment protocol, at least one of the players can cheat with probability at least γ = Then, we provide a matching upper bound. We describe a quantum bit commitment protocol that achieves a cheating probability arbitrarily close to γ. Our protocol uses a weak coin flipping protocol with cheating probability 1/2 + as a subroutine and achieves a cheating probability for the bit commitment of γ + O( ).
Theorem 3. For any ε > 0, there exists a quantum bit commitment protocol that achieves cheating probabilities less than γ +ε = 69 + 48
This protocol also uses Mochon's quantum weak coin flipping. However this protocol makes use of quantum phenomena even beyond the weak coin flip subroutine. This is in fact necessary. We show that any classical bit commitment protocol with access to a perfect weak coin (or even strong coin) cannot achieve cheating probability less than 3/4.
Theorem 4. Any classical bit commitment protocol with access to perfect weak (or strong) coin flipping cannot achieve cheating probabilities smaller than 3/4.
Unlike the case of quantum strong coin flipping that is derived classically when one has access to a weak coin flipping protocol, the optimal quantum bit commitment protocol that we describe takes advantage of quantum effects beyond the weak coin flipping subroutine.
The following tables present old bounds and new bounds obtained in this article for quantum cryptographic primitives, for any ε > 0.
Old bounds for cheating probabilities, where ε is any arbitrary positive constant. 
Preliminaries. We assume that the reader is familiar with basic notions of quantum computing. A good introduction to quantum computing can be found in [22] .
2.1. Useful facts about the fidelity and trace distance of two quantum states. We start by stating a few properties of the trace distance ∆ and fidelity F between two quantum states. These two notions are a measure of how close two quantum states are.
Trace distance between two quantum states.
Definition 5. For any two quantum states ρ, σ, the trace distance ∆(ρ, σ) between them is defined as ∆(ρ, σ) := 1 2 ρ − σ tr where the used trace norm is expressed as X tr := √ X † X = max U |tr(XU )|, where the maximization is taken over all unitary matrices of the appropriate size. We have by definition ∆(ρ, σ) = ∆(σ, ρ).
Proposition 6. For any two states ρ, σ, and a POVM E = {E 1 , . . . , E m } with p i = tr(ρE i ) and q i = tr(σE i ), we have ∆(ρ, σ) ≥ 1 2
There is a POVM (even a projective measurement) for which this inequality is an equality.
Proposition 7 (Optimal Helstrom measurements [13] ). Suppose Alice has a uniformly random bit c ∈ R {0, 1} unknown to Bob. Alice sends a quantum state ρ c to Bob. We have
There is a strategy for Bob that achieves the value
Proposition 8. For any two states ρ, σ such that ρ = i p i |i i| and σ = i q i |i i|, we have
Proof. Since i p i = i q i = 1, we have i:pi≥qi (p i − q i ) = i:pi<qi (q i − p i ) and
Proposition 9 (from [22] ). For any two states ρ, σ such that
Fidelity of quantum states.
Definition 10. For any two states ρ, σ, their fidelity F is given by
Proposition 11. For any two states ρ, σ, and a POVM E = {E 1 , . . . , E m } with p i = tr(ρE i ) and q i = tr(σE i ), we have F (ρ, σ) ≤ i √ p i q i . There is a POVM for which this inequality is an equality.
Definition 12. We say that a pure state |ψ in A ⊗ B is a purification of some state ρ over B if Tr A (|ψ ψ|) = ρ.
Proposition 13 (Uhlmann's theorem). For any two quantum states ρ, σ, there exists a purification |φ of ρ and a purification |ψ of σ such that | φ|ψ | = F (ρ, σ). Proposition 14. For any two quantum states ρ, σ and a completely positive trace preserving operation Q, we have
Proposition 15 ( [23, 21] ). For any two quantum states ρ, σ
Proposition 16 ([11] ). For any quantum states ρ, σ, we have
Quantum communication protocols.
In this article, we will quantum cryptographic primitives, which are communication protocols between two parties Alice and Bob. We study consider communication protocols that start from scratch, meaning that Alice and Bob do not have any extra resources, such as an entangled state, that they need to use in order to perform the protocol. A communication protocol consists of the following actions:
• Alice creates some fresh quantum registers A and M , each of dimension k (i .e. consisting of log(k) qubits) and initializes them at |0 . Bob creates a fresh quantum register B of size k and initializes it at |0 . • In the first round of the protocol, Alice performs a unitary operation U 
describes any quantum protocol of the above form and consists of
• An integer k ≥ 1 and 3 quantum registers A, M, B of size at most k.
• An integer n which represents the number of rounds of the protocol.
• Quantum unitary operations {U Depending on the context, we will add some classical inputs and/or outputs to the communication protocol. Here, we restrict ourselves to communication protocols which only involve quantum unitary operations. We could imagine more general actions such as measurements in the middle of the protocol. Due to standard purification theorems, it will be possible (in the cases we study at least), to transform any general communication protocol into a canonical one while preserving the features of the protocol.
2.3. Quantum strong coin flipping. In a coin flipping protocol, the goal of Alice and Bob is to agree on a random bit such that no malicious party can deviate too much its value towards a desired outcome. A strong coin flipping protocol is a communication protocol with 3 possible outputs. Lower bounds for quantum and classical coin flipping when honest players can abort with some probability was studied in [12] .
A cheating player can deviate arbitrarily from the protocol but still outputs a value at the end of it. A dishonest party can work on some different quantum registers, but never has access to the other player's private Hilbert space. A cheating Alice never has access to register B and a cheating Bob never has access to register A. A cheating strategy for Bob will be fully specified by a working register B * and quantum operations U * B i acting on M ⊗B * . Similarly, a cheating strategy for Alice will be fully specified by a working register A * and quantum operations U * A i acting on A * ⊗ M .
Definition 20. The optimal cheating strategy P * A for Alice of a strong coin flipping protocol is defined as
where Pr[c = x|S A ] corresponds to the probability of obtaining c = x in the protocol, when Alice applies strategy S A and Bob is honest.
Definition 21. The optimal cheating strategy P * B for Bob of a strong coin flipping protocol is defined as
where Pr[c = x|S B ] corresponds to the probability of obtaining c = x in the protocol, when Alice is honest and Bob applies strategy S B .
Definition 22. The optimal cheating probabilty P * of a strong coin flipping protocol is defined as P * := max{P * A , P * B }. The bias ε of the protocol is defined as ε := P * − 1 2 . We say that the coin flipping is perfect if ε = 0. Definition 23. We denote by SCF (ε) any strong coin flipping protocol which is correct and has bias ε.
On the unitarity of strong coin flipping protocols. Here, we considered only protocols that use unitary operations. However, the parties can sometimes do other operations, like manipulating classical bits or performing measurements. From standard purification theorems, any such operations can be reduced to performing quantum unitary operations, without altering the correctness of the protocol, or changing the bias. In many cases, we will present some non-unitary descriptions of coin flipping protocols and slightly different use of quantum registers, but it is important to know that there are unitary protocols of the presented form which will be essentially equivalent. Similarly, the cheating strategies can always be transformed into ones involving only unitary operations. A more detailed discussion on this matter can be found for example in [20] .
2.3.1. Example. We present here a general construction of quantum strong coin flipping protocols that can achieve a cheating probability of 3/4. Most quantum strong coin flipping protocols are of this form [2, 3, 14] .
General construction of quantum strong coin flipping protocols
• Alice picks a random a ∈ {0, 1}, creates some state |ψ a in some space A ⊗ M and sends the qubits in space M to Bob. Let's call σ a the reduced state of |ψ a that Alice sends to Bob.
• Bob picks a random b ∈ {0, 1} and sends b to Alice.
• Alice reveals a and sends the qubits in A to Bob.
• Bob checks that the joint state sent by Alice corresponds to |ψ a . To do so, he applies the projective measurement {|ψ a ψ a |, I −|ψ a ψ a |}. Let's analyze this protocol in more detail. Alice and Bob are honest. In this case, Alice honestly sends |ψ a and a before Bob's measurement. When he measures in the {|ψ a ψ a |, I − |ψ a ψ a |}, he will always get the first outcome and never abort. Therefore, both players will output a ⊕ b and the output of the coin will be a ⊕ b. Since a and b are uniformly random bits, the outcome of the coin is also uniformly random.
Alice cheats and Bob is honest. Suppose that Alice wants c = 0 as an outcome of the protocol (the same proof will follow for c = 1). As a first message, Alice can create any state |φ in registers A ⊗ M and sends the M register to Bob. σ is the reduced state of the message, Alice holds on to its purification. Bob then picks a random b.
If b = 0, Alice wants to reveal a = 0. Alice applies a quantum operation on her qubits, then sends a = 0 and the A register to Bob. Let ρ 0 the state in registers A⊗M. Bob accepts with probability
. This means that the outcome of the coin flip will be 0 with probability at most F 2 (σ, σ 0 ). Notice that by Uhlmann's theorem, Alice can apply an operation on A such that the resulting joint state |φ 0 in A ⊗ M satisfies | φ 0 |ψ 0 | 2 = F 2 (σ, σ 0 ) so the above bound can be achieved by a cheating strategy for Alice.
If b = 1, Alice wants to reveal a = 1. As before, we can show that there is an optimal strategy for Alice that succeeds with probability F 2 (σ, σ 1 ). Since b is random, we have
We want to remove the dependency on σ to prove an upper bound on Alice's cheating probability. We can use Proposition 15 and show that there is a cheating strategy such that
Bob cheats and Alice is honest. As before, we can suppose that Bob wants c = 0. This means that he wants to send b = a. This is equivalent to saying that Bob wants to guess a when having σ a . By Proposition 7, we have that
By the Fuchs -Van de Graaf inequalities (Proposition 16), we know that
. This means in particular that
2 .
From this, we have P * A + P * B ≥ 3/2 and max{P * A , P * B } ≥ 3/4 hence any quantum strong coin flipping of this form has cheating probability at least 3/4.
It is actually possible to achieve this bound. Consider the following states:
Those states correspond to Ambainis's protocol [3] even though this formulation is due to Kerenidis and Nayak [14] . We can easily calculate that F (σ 0 , σ 1 ) = ∆(σ 0 , σ 1 ) = 1/2 which gives us directly P * The two outcomes c = 0 and c = 1 will play a different role. c = 0 will correspond to Alice winning and c = 1 will correspond to Bob winning. We will often explicitly name those outputs as 'Alice wins' and 'Bob wins'. The goal of a malicious party will be to win with the highest probability. The security guarantee will be that a malicious party cannot cheat with too high a probability. One could ask why we do not allow the players to abort? In all the security conditions below, any player -honest or dishonest -would rather output 'I win' rather than output Abort. Therefore, for simplicity, we omitted this possibility completely.
Cheating strategies behave in the same way as in strong coin flipping. However, the goals of the cheating players will be different. Here, each player will want to bias the outcome of the protocol towards him winning. For a dishonest player, losing and having the protocol abort will be similarly bad. Therefore, we can assume that a cheating player always outputs 'I win'.
Definition 25. The optimal cheating strategy P * A for Alice of a weak coin flipping protocol is defined as
where Pr[c = 0|S A ] corresponds to the probability of obtaining c = 0 in the protocol, when Alice applies strategy S A and Bob is honest. Note that we also have
This quantity is always larger than the previous one and can be achieved if cheating Alice always outputs c A = 0.
Definition 26. The optimal cheating strategy P * B for Bob of a weak coin flipping protocol is defined as
where Pr[c = 1|S B ] corresponds to the probability of obtaining c = 1 in the protocol, when Alice is honest and Bob applies strategy S B .
Definition 27. The optimal cheating probabilty P * of a weak coin flipping protocol is defined as P * := max{P * A , P * B }. The bias ε of the protocol is defined as ε := P * − 1 2 . We say that the coin flipping is perfect if ε = 0. Definition 28. A weak coin flipping protocol is said to be a balanced weak coin flipping protocol with bias ε, denoted W CF ( • This weak coin flipping protocol has bias ε.
Definition 29. A weak coin flipping protocol is said to be a weak coin flipping protocol with parameter z and bias ε, denoted W CF (z, ε) if is satisfies the following:
• If Alice and Bob are honest then
• P * A ≤ z + ε and P * B ≤ 1 − z + ε. Unlike strong coin flipping, it is possible to create a balanced quantum weak coin flipping protocol with bias arbitrarily close to 0. This construction is due to Mochon [20] .
Theorem 30. For any ε > 0, there exists a quantum weak coin flipping protocol with cheating probabilities less than 1 2 + ε. The above result had not been peer reviewed and was in an unknown status for a long time. A superset of the authors recently worked on Mochon's protocol and have managed to verify and arguably simplify the proof. This article will appear in [1] . Nevertheless, the proof remains non-constructive and many mysteries remain regarding the exact nature of Mochon's weak coin flipping.
2.4.1. Reformulation of Quantum weak coin flipping protocol. In a quantum protocol, Alice and Bob have an output qubit each which they measure to determine the values of c A , c B . When using weak-coin flipping in a quantum protocol, it will be useful to keep the quantumness of this output.
We reformulate here the definition of a quantum weak coin flipping to take into account the fact that Alice and Bob are quantum players that perform unitary operations during the protocol and at the end they perform a measurement on a quantum register in order to get their classical output. This will be useful when using quantum weak coin flipping in a quantum protocol as in Section 5.
More precisely, let O A ⊆ A (resp. O B ⊆ B) be Alice's (resp. Bob's) qubit output register. At the end of the protocol Alice (resp. Bob) has a state ρ A in O A (resp. ρ B in O B ). They also share some garbage state. The players get their output value by measuring their output qubit in the {|0 , |1 } basis.
Definition 31. A weak coin flipping protocol is correct and balanced if Definition 34. A (balanced) weak coin flipping protocol with bias ε, denoted as W CF (1/2, ε), has the following properties:
• It is correct and balanced.
•
A weak coin flipping protocol is said to be a weak coin flipping protocol with parameter z and bias ε, denoted W CF (z, ε) if is satisfies the following:
These definitions are very similar to Definitions 28 and 29 where we slightly changed the definitions of the cheating probabilities and made explicit the probabilities of honest outcomes in terms of the quantum states of the protocol.
2.4.2.
Sharing an entangled state does not increase the bias. In this paper, we will use Mochon's weak coin flipping in the middle of some other quantum protocol but we only know stand alone security for this protocol. We will now show that whatever happens before the weak coin flipping protocol cannot alter its stand alone security. This does not imply stronger notions of composability but it will be enough for showing the stand-alone security of our quantum strong coin flipping and bit commitment constructions.
What we show here is that if Alice and Bob share an entangled state |φ prior to performing Mochon's weak coin flipping protocol, this will not change the bias of the protocol. The reason for this is that at each instantiation of the protocol, honest Alice and honest Bob create fresh quantum registers on which they will perform the protocol and the honest player's part of |φ will not influence his or her output.
Assume there exists a strategy S for cheating Bob that achieves some cheating probability p b = Pr[Alice outputs c A = 1], when sharing with honest Alice an entangled state |φ in some registers A B . In the protocol, Alice creates fresh registers A and M and totally disregards any other qubits, including those in A . This is a specification of our protocol.
Let us now construct another cheating strategy S for Bob where he doesn't share any state with Alice. Bob creates the same registers as in S and creates the state |φ in some extra registers A B . Then, he performs exactly the same strategy as in S, disregarding the register A . The probability that Alice outputs c A = 1 is the same as in the previous setting and therefore, Bob's cheating strategy when performing S is ε b .
From there, we conclude that a cheating Bob cannot take advantage of a shared state |φ . A similar discussion can be made for cheating Alice. Therefore, we conclude that a shared entangled state doesn't reduce the stand-alone security of Mochon's weak coin flipping protocol.
2.5. Quantum bit commitment. Bit commitment is a cryptographic primitive between two distrustful parties Alice and Bob which consists of 2 phases: a Commit phase and a Reveal phase. Alice has a random bit b at the beginning of the protocol. In the commit phase, Alice will commit to this value b by performing some communication protocol such that at end of the commit phase, Bob no information about b. In the second phase, the reveal phase, Alice and Bob also perform some communication which results in Alice revealing b. A desired property here is that Alice is unable to reveal a bit different from the one chosen during the commit phase.
In some sense, a bit commitment protocol simulates a digital safe. In the commit phase, Alice writes her input b on a piece of paper, puts that paper into the safe and sends the safe to Bob. If Bob has no information about the key of the safe then he cannot open it and therefore has no information about b. In the reveal phase, Alice would send to Bob the key to open the safe but she cannot change the value of the bit in the safe because Bob has control of the safe. This primitive has been widely studied. However, classical bit commitment can only be performed with computational security.
We now define more formally a quantum bit commitment scheme.
Definition 36. A quantum commitment scheme is an interactive protocol between Alice and Bob with two phases, a Commit phase and a Reveal phase.
• Commit phase. Alice chooses a uniformly random input b that she wants to commit to. To do so, Alice and Bob perform a communication protocol and at the end of the commit phase, Bob has a state ρ b .
• Reveal phase. Alice interacts with Bob in order to reveal b. They start with the joint quantum state they have at the end of the commit phase. They then perform an second communication protocol where at the end, Bob performs a measurement with a pair of outcomes, a bit b and "Accept" or "Reject".
We also define the following security requirements for the commitment scheme.
Definition 37. A bit commitment protocol is said to be correct if when both players are honest, Bob always outputs as b the bit to which Alice commited and outputs "Accept".
A cheating strategy S for Alice can be always decomposed into a cheating strategy S commit for the commit phase and S reveal for the reveal phase and we will usually write S = (S Commit , S reveal ). S Commit (resp. S reveal ) contains the descriptions of the unitary operations used by cheating Alice in the commit (resp. reveal) phase. The goal of a cheating Alice is to choose the value she wants to reveal only after the commit phase. In the commit phase, she may taylor her strategy so as to maximize success in the reveal phase, as in Definitions 38 and 39. The reveal strategy S reveal will depend on the value b she wants to reveal. We denote by S reveal (b) Alice's cheating strategy in the reveal phase for a fixed b.
We say that Alice successfully reveals b if Bob outputs b = b and outputs "Accept". Definition 39. We define Alice's optimal cheating probability P * A as
Another security condition we want to ensure is the hiding property. At the end of the commit phase, we don't want Bob to have a lot of information about the committed bit b. This means that to ensure the hiding property, we will only interested in a cheating Bob's strategy during the commit phase, and a cheating strategy S B for Bob will be a strategy that he will use to try to learn b after the commit phase.
Definition 40. For a fixed cheating strategy S B for Bob, we define his cheating probability P * B (S B ) as
where Alice is honest and commits to a uniformly random bit b.
Definition 41. We define Bob's optimal cheating probability P * B as
We can now put those definitions together.
Definition 42. We say that a bit commitment protocol has a cheating probability P * if: 1. The bit commitment protocol is correct.
Remark. The definition of quantum bit commitment we use is the standard one when one studies stand-alone cryptographic primitives. In this setting, quantum bit commitment has a clear relation to other fundamental primitives such as coin flipping and oblivious transfer [2, 3, 15, 20, 8] . Moreover, the study of such primitives sheds light on the quantum advantage quantum mechanics gives in the design of the primitives. Recently there have been some stronger definitions of Quantum Bit Commitment protocols that suit better practical uses (see for example [9] ). Notice that using our weaker definition of quantum bit commitment only strengthens our lower bound which also holds for the stronger ones.
3. An unbalanced weak coin flipping protocol from balanced weak coin flipping protocol. In the quantum setting, it is known by Mochon's protocol how to build a weak coin flipping protocol which is arbitrarily close to optimal. However, this gives us a balanced weak coin flipping protocol. A natural question is whether we can extend this construction to an unbalanced weak coin flipping protocol.
We show here how to use any almost optimal balanced weak coin flipping protocol to build an almost optimal unbalanced weak coin flipping protocol. This procedure will be purely classical and will use the balanced weak coin flipping as a black box. These unbalanced protocols will be very useful to construct optimal quantum coin flipping and bit commitment protocols. We will use here the original formulation with classical outputs from Definition 29.
Our goal is to prove the following proposition
Proposition 43. Let P be a W CF (1/2, ε) protocol with N rounds. Then, ∀z ∈ [0, 1] and ∀k ∈ N, there exists a W CF (x, ε 0 ) protocol Q such that:
• Q uses kN rounds.
The protocol Q is a sequential composition of the W CF (1/2, ε) protocol P . We use P in order to combine two weak coin flipping protocols with parameters z 1 and z 2 into a new protocol with parameter z1+z2 2 . Then, by recursion, for any given z we can create a protocol Q with parameter x that rapidly converges to z. We also prove that the bias of Q is at most 2ε.
Assume we have a W CF (z 1 , ε 0 ) protocol P 1 and a W CF (z 2 , ε 0 ) protocol P 2 each with at most M rounds of communication and z 2 ≥ z 1 . We combine them in the following way.
Comb(P 1 , P 2 )
• Alice and Bob run P . The result of P is publicly known to both players.
• If Alice wins in P , run P 2 and each player outputs their output of P 2 . If Bob wins in P , run P 1 and each player outputs their output of P 1 . If the outcome of P is Abort then both players output Abort.
Note that this protocol uses at most N + M rounds. We have
Alice and Bob are honest (Completeness). When both players are honest, they never abort in P and therefore always output the same non-Abort output in Comb(P 1 , P 2 ) which implies that this protocol never aborts. Moreover, since P is balanced, the result of P is 'Alice wins' with probability with probability 1 2 and 'Bob wins' with probability 1 2 . When Alice wins in P , the 2 players run P 1 in which Alice wins with probability z 1 . When Bob wins in P , the 2 players run P 2 in which Alice wins with probability z 2 . From there, we have . We know the following inequalities concerning these probabilities:
First note that the first inequality above cannot be turned into an equality, because the outcome of P can be Abort. Notice also that the last two inequalities hold, since the biases for the protocols P 1 and P 2 do not increase depending on the outcome of P , nor on any entangled state |ψ that Alice and Bob could share after running P . This is, in short, because when performing P 1 or P 2 , the honest player (here Bob), creates fresh new qubits for performing this protocol and can disregard his part of |ψ . A more detailed discussion of this fact was made in Section 2.4.2.
From there, we have Pr [ Alice wins Comb(P 1 , P 2 )]
Bob cheats and Alice is honest. Using a similar calculation as in the previous case, we have Pr[Bob wins Comb(
Our goal now is to prove proposition 43. For a fixed z ∈ [0, 1], we use the Comb procedure to inductively produce two coin flipping protocols that become closer and closer to the desired coin flip W CF (z, ε 0 ). This is what we do in the next Lemma.
Lemma 45. Suppose we have a W CF (1/2, ε) protocol P that uses N rounds of communication. Then ∀z ∈ [0, 1] and ∀k ∈ N, we can construct a W CF (x 1 , ε 0 ) protocol P 1 and a W CF (x 2 , ε 0 ) protocol P 2 such that
• P 1 , P 2 each use at most kN rounds.
Proof. Fix z ∈ [0, 1]. We show this result by induction on k. We clearly have a W CF (0, 0) protocol (a protocol where Bob always wins) and a W CF (1, 0) (a protocol where Alice always wins) that use no rounds of communication, which shows the lemma for k = 0. We suppose the Lemma is true for k and we show it for k + 1. Let x 1 , x 2 , P 1 , P 2 , ε 0 satisfy the above properties for k. Let P be the Comb(P 1 , P 2 ) protocol and u = x1+x2 2
. P uses at most (k + 1)N rounds and from Lemma 44, we know that P is a W CF (u, ε 0 ) protocol where ε 0 := ε 0 + (x 2 − x 1 )ε. From the induction step we have that ε 0 ≤ (2 − 2(x 2 − x 1 ))ε + (x 2 − x 1 )ε ≤ (2 − (x 2 − x 1 ))ε. We now distinguish two cases
• If z ≤ u, consider the protocols P 1 and P . Each one uses at most (k + 1)N rounds. Also,
)ε which concludes the proof.
• If z > u, consider the protocols P and P 2 . Each one uses at most (k + 1)N rounds. Also, u ≤ z ≤ x 2 and x 2 − u = x2−x1 2 = 2 −(k+1) . Finally, ε 0 ≤ (2 − (x 2 − x 1 ))ε = (2 − 2(x 2 − u))ε which concludes the proof.
In Lemma 45, we have |x 1 − z| ≤ (x 2 − x 1 ) ≤ 2 −k and ε 0 ≤ 2ε. Hence this Lemma directly implies Proposition 43 by considering Q = P 1 .
Unitary quantum weak unbalanced coin flipping. The unbalanced coin flipping of Proposition 43 can also be transformed to a protocol where the two players perform their operations coherently, with quantum unitary operations. They would then end up with a quantum register each corresponding to their outputs. This gives a W CF (x, ε 0 ) in the sense of Definition 35.
Optimal quantum strong coin flipping.
In this Section, we present a general method for using any weak coin-flipping protocol with cheating probability 1/2 + ε in order to construct a strong coin-flipping protocol with cheating probability
, which is our Theorem 1. Our protocol uses roughly the same number of rounds as the weak coin flipping protocol. Combining our construction with Mochon's quantum weak coin flipping protocol that achieves arbitrarily small bias, we conclude that it is possible to construct a quantum strong coin flipping protocol with cheating probability arbitrarily close to
. The protocol is classical and uses the weak coin flipping as a subroutine. In other words, in strong coin flipping, the power of quantum mechanicsis only used to perform weak coin flipping. If a classical weak coin flipping protocol with arbitrarily small bias were possible, then this would have implied a classical strong coin flipping protocol with cheating probability arbitrarily close to 1/ √ 2 as well.
A first attempt.
Using weak coin flipping in order to perform strong coin flipping is not a new idea. There is a simple protocol that uses perfect weak coin flipping and achieves strong coin flipping with cheating probability 3/4: Alice and Bob run the weak coin flipping protocol and whoever wins, flips a random coin c ∈ R {0, 1}.
SCF(3/4) protocol using a perfect weak coin flipping protocol P
• Alice and Bob run the protocol P
• If the output of P is 'Abort' then both players output 'Abort'. Otherwise, the winner of P chooses a random c ∈ R {0, 1}, and sends c to the other player. Both players output then c.
Let us analyze this protocol more closely. Let Alice be dishonest and her desired value for the coin be 0. Her strategy will be to try and win the WCF protocol, which happens with probability 1/2 and then output 0. However, even if she loses the weak coin flipping, there is still a probability 1/2 that the honest Bob will output 0. Hence, Alice's (and by symmetry Bob's) cheating probability is 3/4.
4.2.
The optimal protocol. In order to reduce this bias, we would like to eliminate the situation where the honest player, after winning the WCF, still helps the dishonest player cheat with probability 1/2. One can try to resolve this problem by having Alice flip and announce her random coin c before running the WCF protocol. In this case: first, Alice announces a bit a. Then, Alice and Bob perform a WCF. If Alice wins the outcome is a; if Bob wins then the outcome is a.
In this case, Bob never outputs a. However, there is a simple cheating strategy for Alice. If she wants 0, she sets a = 1, loses the WCF (which she can potentially do with probability 1) and therefore Bob always outputs 0. In order to prevent this, Bob's choice when he wins the WCF will be probabilistic.
Since such protocols are not symmetric, we use an unbalanced weak coin flipping protocol to ensure that the two cheating probabilities are the same. We know how to construct such protocols from balanced protocols using Proposition 43. The coin flipping protocol becomes the following, with parameters p, z ∈ [0, 1] that will be specified later.
Quantum Strong Coin Flipping protocol S with bias
+ O(ε) 1. Alice chooses a ∈ R {0, 1} and sends a to Bob. 2. Alice and Bob perform the W CF (z, ε) protocol Q.
3.
• We will now show how to optimize the parameters z and p in order to make the cheating probability of our protocol at most 1/ √ 2 + O(ε). Security analysis of our protocol. We calculate the cheating probability of our protocol S that uses a W CF (z, ε) protocol Q that uses N rounds of communication. Proof. Alice and Bob are honest (Completeness). If both players are honest then they never abort in Q therefore they never abort in the coin flipping protocol S. If Alice wins Q then the output of the protocol is a which is chosen uniformly at random. If Bob wins Q then the output b is also a uniformly random bit since a is a uniformly random bit. Therefore, we have completeness for this protocol. Alice cheats and Bob is honest. We prove that Pr [c = 0] ≤ 1 2−z−ε . By symmetry, the same holds for Pr [c = 1]. Cheating players may send quantum states instead of the classical bits required by the protocol. In the honest protocol, the players implicitly measure qubits that are supposed to be classical so it we can therefore assume that those messages are classical.
Since Alice cheats, she can choose arbitrarily between a = 0 and a = 1 instead of picking a uniformly at random. Note that x + y ≤ 1 and also x ≤ z + ε, since the maximum bias with which Alice can win Q is independent of the value of a. We have
• 
Putting it all together.
Our goal now is to prove Theorem 1. In order to do so we have to optimize z in the previous proposition. In the case where there exists an ideal weak coin flipping protocol W CF (1/2, 0), it is easy to see that in order to equalize the cheating probabilities P * A and P * B , we need to take z = 2 − √ 2. If also our Proposition 43 was ideal, i.e. if from P we could create perfectly a W CF (2 − √ 2, 0) protocol Q, then S would have cheating probability exactly
. In general, we need to take care of the small bias ε of the initial W CF (1/2, ε) protocol P and the error of our Proposition 43. However, we will see that the overall increase in the cheating probability of our protocol S is only O(ε).
Proposition 47. If there exists a W CF (1/2, ε) protocol P that uses N rounds of communication then there exists a strong coin flipping protocol S that uses 2 log( 1 ε ) · N + 2 rounds with cheating probability at most
Proof. Starting from the W CF (1/2, ε) weak coin flipping protocol P with N rounds, we can use Proposition 43 with k = 2 log( 1 ε ) and construct a W CF (x, ε ) protocol Q with the following properties
• Q uses 2 log(
We use this protocol Q to create a quantum strong coin flipping protocol as described in Section 4.2 and by Proposition 46 we get a strong coin flipping protocol with 2 log( 1 ε ) · N + 2 rounds and
Using Proposition 47 and Mochon's weak coin flipping protocol (Proposition 30) we conclude that
Theorem 48. For any ε > 0, there exists a strong coin flipping protocol with cheating probability
Last, note that our strong coin flipping protocol uses O(N · log( 1 ε )) rounds, where N is the number of rounds of Mochon's weak coin flipping protocol.
5.
Optimal bounds for quantum bit commitment. In this Section, we provide the optimal bound for quantum bit commitment. We first show a lower bound of γ := 69 + 48 √ 2 ≈ 0.739, improving Kitaev's lower bound. We then present an optimal quantum bit commitment protocol which has cheating probability arbitrarily close to γ. More precisely, we show how to use any weak coin flipping protocol with cheating probability 1/2 + ε in order to achieve a quantum bit commitment protocol with cheating probability γ + O(ε). We then use the optimal quantum weak coin flipping protocol described by Mochon [20] to conclude. To stress the fact that our protocol uses quantum effects beyond the weak coin flip, we show that any classical bit commitment protocol with access to perfect weak (or strong) coin flipping has cheating probability at least 3/4.
Lower bound for quantum bit commitment.
To prove the lower bound for quantum bit commitment, we will show some generic cheating strategies for Alice and Bob that work for any kind of bit commitment scheme. We will then show that these cheating strategies give a cheating probability of γ for any protocol.
5.1.1. Description of cheating strategies. We denote by |ψ b the quantum state Alice and Bob share at the end of the commit phase, when both players act honestly. Alice has then quantum registers A and M while Bob has quantum register B. Let σ b = Tr AM |ψ b ψ b | the state that Bob has after the commit phase when Alice honestly commits to bit b.
Bob's cheating strategy. The cheating strategy of Bob is the following:
• Perform the commit phase honestly.
• Guess b by performing on the state at the end of the commit phase the optimal discriminating measurement between σ 0 and σ 1 . First note that an all-powerful Bob can always perform this strategy, since he knows the honest states σ 0 and σ 1 and can hence compute and perform the optimal measurement. Let us analyze this strategy. We know [13] that Bob can guess b with probability and hence
Alice's cheating strategy. The cheating strategy of Alice is the following:
• Commit phase. Perform a quantum strategy so that at the end of the commit phase, Bob has the state σ + = 1 2 (σ 0 + σ 1 ). We describe how this is done in detail below. Let |φ the purification of σ + that corresponds to the joint state between Alice and Bob at the end of this step.
• In order to reveal a specific value b, send b then apply a local quantum operation U b on A ⊗ M such that the resulting joint state of the protocol,
. Perform the rest of the reveal phase honestly. First note that an all-powerful Alice can perform this strategy. An honest Alice has a strategy to make Bob's state after the commit phase equal to σ b for both b = 0 and b = 1. A cheating Alice creates a qubit
(|0 + |1 ). Conditioned on 0 (resp. 1), she follows the protocol as if she wanted to honestly commit to 0 (resp. 1). This will give Bob the state σ 0 (resp. σ 1 ). By doing this, the joint state becomes exactly
(|0 |ψ 0 + |1 |ψ 1 ); and Bob's state at the end of the commit phase is exactly σ + . Moreover, by Uhlmann's theorem, Alice can compute and perform the local unitary in the beginning of the reveal phase to create a state |φ b that satisfies
For the analysis, since Bob accepts b with probability 1 when the joint state of the protocol is |ψ b , he accepts with probability at least
when the joint state of the protocol is |φ b . From this cheating strategy, we have that
Showing the Lower Bound.
We have the following bounds for cheating Alice and cheating Bob.
We now use the following inequality that will be proved in the next section Proposition 49. Let σ 0 , σ 1 any two quantum states. Let
Let t = ∆(σ 0 , σ 1 ). From the above Proposition, we have the following bounds.
We get an upper bound on the optimal cheating probability by equalizing these two bounds, i.e.
Notice that the same cheating probabilities appeared in the analysis of a weak coin flipping protocol in [14] . Proof (of Proposition 49). We will prove this Proposition in three steps. Let σ 0 , σ 1 two quantum states and let σ + = 1 2 (σ 0 + σ 1 ).
Step 1. We first consider the states
We compute the trace distance and fidelity of these states
In order to calculate the fidelity we first use ρ
+ . From the definition of fidelity we have
Hence, by Cauchy-Schwarz we conclude that
Step 2. Consider the POVM E = {E 1 , . . . , E m } with p i = tr(ρ 0 E i ) and
We consider the states D 0 = i p i |i i| and D + = i q i |i i|. For the trace distance and fidelity of these states, we have
and Eq. 1
Step 3. Let us define k such that k/2 = ∆(D 0 , D + ). We now consider the states
We calculate the trace distance and fidelity of these states
The only thing remaining is to show that
To prove this, we construct a completely positive trace preserving operation Q such that Q(T 0 ) = D 0 and Q(T + ) = D + . We can then conclude using Proposition 14.
We define Proposition 8) . Q is hence a completely positive trace preserving operation. We now have:
Similarly, we have
From this, we conclude that
Putting everything together, we have using equations 2,4,6,7
Upper Bound for quantum bit commitment. In this section we describe and analyze a protocol that proves the optimality of our bound.
Theorem 51. There exists a quantum bit commitment protocol that uses a weak coin flipping protocol with cheating probability 1/2 + as a subroutine and achieves cheating probabilities less than 0.739 + O( ).
Our protocol is a quantum improvement of the following simple protocol that achieves cheating probability 3/4. Alice commits to bit b by preparing the state 1/ √ 2(|bb + |22 ) and sending the second qutrit to Bob. In the reveal phase, she sends the first qutrit and Bob checks that the pure state is the correct one. It is not hard to prove that both Alice and Bob can cheat with probability 3/4 [3, 14] . The main idea in order to reduce the cheating probabilities for both players is the following: first we increase a little bit the amplitude of the state |22 in this superposition. This decreases the cheating probability of Bob. However, now Alice can cheat even more. To remedy this, we use the quantum procedure of a weak coin flipping so that Alice and Bob jointly create the above initial state (with the appropriate amplitudes) instead of having Alice create it herself. We present now the details of the protocol.
The protocol.
Optimal Quantum Bit Commitment Commit phase, Step 1. Alice and Bob perform an unbalanced weak coin flipping procedure (without measuring the final outcome), where Alice wins with probability 1 − p and Bob with probability p. We can think of this procedure as a unitary operation that creates a joint pure state in the space of Alice and Bob. Moreover, Alice and Bob have each a special 1-qubit register that they can measure at the end of the protocol in order to read the outcome of the weak coin flipping. Here, we assume that they do not measure anything and that at the end Alice sends back to Bob all her garbage qubits. In other words, in the honest case, Alice and Bob share the following state at the end of the weak coin protocol
where W corresponds to the outcome "Alice wins" and L corresponds to the outcome "Alice loses". The spaces O A and B correspond respectively to Alice's output register and Bob's quantum registers that contain everything else. The garbage states |G W , |G L are known to both players. Commit phase, Step 2. After the end of the weak coin flipping procedure, Alice does the following. Conditioned on her output qubit being W , she creates two qutrits in the state |22 in new quantum registers and sends the second to Bob. Conditioned on her qubit being L, she creates two qutrits in the state |bb where b is the bit she wants to commit to and sends the second to Bob. If the players are both honest, they share the following state: Cheating Bob. Bob is not necessarily honest in the weak coin flipping protocol, however the weak coin flipping has small bias . Since Alice is honest, Bob has all the qubits except the one qubit which is in Alice's output register. At the end of the first step of the Commit phase, Alice and Bob share a state
for some states |Ψ L , |Ψ W held by Bob. Recall that the outcome L in Alice's output register corresponds to the outcome where Alice loses (i.e. Bob wins) the weak coin flipping protocol. Hence, for any cheating Bob, since our coin flipping has bias ε, we have p ≤ p + ε. At the end of the commit phase, depending on Alice's committed bit b, the joint state is
By Proposition 7, we have
Alice. Let σ b be Bob's reduced state at the end of the commit phase when both players are honest. Let | x = |L, x, G L for x ∈ {0, 1} and | 2 = |W, 2, G W . We have
Let ξ be Bob's reduced state at the end of the commit phase for a cheating Alice. Let r i = i|ξ| i for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. From the characterization of the fidelity in Proposition 14, we have that
Using Uhlmann's theorem, as in Section 2.3.1, we have
.
In order to get a tight bound for the above expression, we use here security of the weak coin flipping protocol we use. Recall that | 2 = |W, 2, G W has its first register in state W (this corresponds to Alice winning the coin flip). On the other hand, | 0 and | 1 have L as their first register, corresponding to the case where Bob wins. For any cheating Alice, she can win the weak coin flip with probability at most 1 − p + ε and hence this means in particular that r 2 ≤ 1 − p + ε. Moreover, r 0 + r 1 + r 2 ≤ 1. For ε < p(1 − 1 2−p ), we show that this quantity is maximal when r 2 is maximal and r 0 = r 1 = (p − ε)/2 (proven in the next Section). This gives us
Notice that for any value of p ∈]0, 1[, it is possible to find ε such that ε < p(1 − 1 2−p ) so we always choose an ε small enough to satisfy the above bound.
Putting it all together. Except for the terms in ε, we obtain exactly the same quantities as in our lower bound. By equalizing these cheating probabilities, we have
which proves Theorem 3. Since we can have ε arbitrarily close to 0 (Proposition 30) and we can have an unbalanced weak coin flipping protocol with probability arbitrarily close to p (Proposition 43), we conclude that our protocol is arbitrarily close to optimal.
5.2.3. Proof of r 0 = r 1 and r 2 maximal in the quantum lower bound. In this Section, we show the following:
with the constraints: r 0 , r 1 , r 2 ≥ 0, r 0 +r 1 +r 2 ≤ 1 and r 2 ≤ 1−p+ε for ε < p(1− 1 2−p ). This cheating probability is maximized for r 0 = r 1 = p−ε 2 and r 2 = 1 − p + ε.
Proof. First note that the maximal cheating probability is achieved for r 0 + r 1 + r 2 = 1 since this cheating probability is increasing in r 0 , r 1 , r 2 .
We first show that r 0 = r 1 . Let's fix r 2 . This means that S = r 0 + r 1 = 1 − r 2 is fixed. Let u = (1 − p)r 2 . We have
Taking the derivative, we get
We have f (r 0 ) > 0 for r 0 < S/2 ; f (r 0 ) = 0 for r 0 = S/2 ; f (r 0 ) < 0 for r 0 > S/2. This means that the maximum of f is achieved for r 0 = S/2 i .e. r 0 = r 1 .
We now show that r 2 = 1 − p + ε gives the maximal cheating probability if ε is not too big. Since P * A is maximal for r 0 = r 1 and for r 0 + r 1 + r 2 = 1, we have
Again, we take the derivative of g.
From this, we have
) is always increasing when r 2 ≤ 1 − p + ε and is maximal when r 2 = 1 − p + ε, which concludes the proof for the cheating probability.
5.3. Proof of the classical lower bound. In this Section, we show a 3/4 lower bound for classical bit commitment schemes when players additionally have the power to perform perfect (strong or weak) coin-flipping. This will show that unlike strong coin flipping, quantum and classical bit commitment are not alike in the presence of weak coin flipping.
The idea of the lower bound is simple. Consider any classical bit commitment scheme which uses coin flipping. Our cheating parties will only cheat during the reveal phase and will stay honest during the commit phase and the coin flips. After the commit phase, there will be a public transcript and there will be 2 cases: (1) Alice can reveal both values or (2) Alice can reveal only one specific value x (the one she committed to). If the players know in which case they are, then one of them can cheat with probability 1. Indeed, (1) implies that Alice can cheat perfectly and (2) also implies that Bob knows the value x Alice can reveal therefore he can guess x.
The players do not know in which case they are because of their private randomness but we will show that this will only randomize the 2 cases above, and therefore one of the players will always be able to cheat with probability at least 3/4. The main difficulty is to deal with this private randomness.
We first describe such protocols in Section 5.3.1. In Section 5.3.2, we construct a cheating strategy for Alice and Bob for these protocols such that one of the players can cheat with probability at least 3/4.
5.3.1. Description of a classical bit commitment protocol with perfect coin flips. We describe classical bit commitment schemes when players additionally have the power to perform perfect (strong or weak) coin-flipping. The way we deal with the coin is the following: when Alice and Bob are honest, they always output the same random value c and both players know this value. We can suppose equivalently that a random coin c is given publicly to both Alice and Bob each time they perform coin flipping.
We now describe any bit commitment protocol with coins. Each phase is a communication protocol between Alice and Bob. Each player's message can depend on the previous messages, its randomness and, for the case of Alice, the bit x she wants to commit to.
• Alice and Bob have some private randomness R A and R B respectively.
• Commit phase: Alice wants to commit to some value x. Let N the number of rounds of the commit phase. For i = 1 to N : Alice sends a message a i , Bob sends a message b i , Alice and Bob flip a coin and get a public c i ∈ R {0, 1}.
• Reveal phase: Alice wants to decommit to some value y (= x if Alice is honest). 1. Alice first reveals y. This is a restriction for the protocol but showing a lower bound for such protocols will show a lower bound for all protocols since this can only limit Alice's cheating possibilities and cannot increase Bob's cheating possibilities as well. 2. Let M the number of rounds of the reveal phase. For i = 1 to M : Alice sends a message a i , Bob sends a message b i , Alice and Bob flip a coin and get a public c i ∈ R {0, 1}. 3. Bob has an accepting procedure Acc to decide whether he accepts the revealed bit or whether he aborts (if Bob catches Alice cheating). We denote the commit phase transcript by t C = (a 1 , b 1 , c 1 , . . . , a N , b N , c N ) . If Alice and Bob are honest, then we can write t C = T C (R A , R B , c, x) where T C is a function fixed by the protocol that takes as input Alice and Bob's private coins R A , R B , the outcomes of the public coin flips c = (c 1 , . . . , c N ) as well as the bit x Alice wants to commit to and outputs a commit phase transcript t C . If we can write t C = T C (R A , R B , c, x) for some R A , R B , c, x, we say that t C is an honest commit phase transcript.
We also define the reveal phase transcript as t D := (a 1 , b 1 , c 1 , . . . , a M , b M , c M ). If Alice and Bob are honest, we can write t D = T D (R A , R B , c , y, t C ), where T D is a function fixed by the protocol that takes as input Alice and Bob's private coins R A , R B , the outcomes of the public coin flips c = (c 1 , . . . , c M ), the bit y Alice reveals as well as the commit phase transcript t C and outputs a reveal phase transcript t D . If we can write t D = T D (R A , R B , c , y, t C ) for some R A , R B , c , y and some honest commit phase transcript t C , we say that t D is an honest reveal phase transcript.
Whether Bob accepts at the end of the protocol depends on both transcripts t C , t D of the commit and reveal phase, the bit y Alice reveals as well as Bob's private coins. We write that Acc(t C , t D , y, R B ) = 1 when Bob accepts.
In the honest case, we require Bob always accepts the bit Alice reveals. This means that we can transform Alice's honest strategy in the reveal phase to a deterministic strategy which will also be always accepted. This fact will be useful in the proof.
5.3.2.
Proof of the classical lower bound. In this Section, we construct cheating strategies for Alice and Bob such that one of the players will be able to cheat with probability at least 3/4. We only consider cheating strategies where Alice and Bob are honest during the coin flips so again, the coins will be modeled as public and perfectly random coins. Moreover, Alice and Bob will always be honest during the commit phase.
Before describing the cheating strategies we need some definitions. More particularly, we consider a cheating Alice who cheats during the reveal phase by following a deterministic strategy A * . For a fixed honest commit phase transcript t C , we can write the transcript of the reveal phase as a function of A * , R B , c , y, t C , more precisely T * D (A * , R B , c , y, t C ).
Definition 53. We say that R B is consistent with t C if and only if there exist R A , c, x such that t C = T C (R A , R B , c, x).
Definition 54. Let t C be an honest commit phase transcript. We say that t C ∈ A y if and only if ∃A * s.t. ∀c and ∀R B consistent with t C , Acc(t C , T * D (A * , R B , c , y, t C ), y, R B ) = 1
Intuitively, t C ∈ A y means that if Alice and Bob output an honest commit phase transcript t C , there is a deterministic strategy A * for Alice that allows her to reveal y without Bob aborting, independently of Bob's private coins R B . Since there is always a deterministic honest strategy for Alice in the reveal phase (when Alice and Bob have been honest in the commit phase), we have ∀ R A , R B , c, x T C (R A , R B , c, x) ∈ A x Notice also that for any honest commit phase transcript t C , both players Alice and Bob can compute whether t C ∈ A u for both u = 0 and u = 1.
Definition 55. We define the probability
where the probability is taken over uniform R A , R B , c. Consider that Bob is honest. p u is the probability that if Alice behaves honestly in the commit phase and commits to u, she has a deterministic cheating strategy to reveal u which succeeds.
We can now describe and analyze our cheating strategies for Alice and Bob and prove our theorem Theorem 56. For any classical bit commitment protocol with access to public perfect coins, one of the players can cheat with probability at least 3/4.
Proof. Let us fix a bit commitment protocol. We describe cheating strategies for Alice and Bob.
Cheating Alice.
• Commit phase: Alice picks x ∈ R {0, 1} and she honestly commits to x during the commit phase.
• Reveal phase: if Alice wants to reveal x, she just remains honest during the reveal phase. By completeness of the protocol, this strategy succeeds with probability 1. If Alice wants to reveal x, we know by definition of p x that she succeeds with probability at least p x . This gives us:
since Alice chooses x at random, we have:
Cheating Bob. As Alice, Bob is honest in the commit phase. Let x the bit Alice committed to. Since Alice and Bob are honest the commit-phase transcript is t C = T C (R A , R B , c, x) for uniformly random R A , R B , c. As said before, we know that t C ∈ A x .
At the end of the commit phase, Bob wants to guess the bit x Alice commits to and he performs the following strategy: if t C ∈ A 0 ∩ A 1 he guesses x at random. If ∃! u s.t. t C / ∈ A u he guesses x = u. We know that Bob succeeds in cheating with at least 1/2 if t C ∈ A x and with probability 1 if t C / ∈ A x . This gives us P * B ≥ p x · Putting it all together. Taking Alice and Bob cheating probabilities together, we have P * A + P * B ≥ 3/2 which gives max{P * A , P * B } ≥ 3/4. 6. Conclusion. In this article, we presented the first quantum strong coin flipping protocol with a cheating probability arbitrarily close to the optimal value 1 √ 2 . Our protocol uses as a subroutine the quantum weak coin flipping protocol designed by Mochon which is arbitrarily close to optimal. Note that except when using this quantum weak coin flipping protocol, our protocol is classical.
We also presented new bounds for quantum bit commitment, improving both the lower bound and the upper bound. In the end, we got a lower bound of γ ≈ 0.739 and a matching upper bound of γ + ε for any ε > 0 which is a construction of a quantum bit commitment arbitrarily close to optimal. The lower bound we obtained is of different flavor than the one found by Kitaev for coin flipping. While Kitaev's lower bound uses semi-definite programming, our bound directly studies quantum states. As our quantum strong coin flipping protocol, this protocol uses Mochon's quantum weak coin flipping as a subroutine. We show however, that in addition to weak coin flipping, one also needs quantum effects elsewhere, since we show that any classical bit commitment with access to perfect coin flips cannot achieve better cheating probabilities than 3/4.
REFERENCES

